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ABSTRACT
 
WOMEN IN LAW--EQUALJUSTICE FOR ALL?
 
Barb Kube, Department of Economics, IWU, Dr. Michael Seeborg*
 
This study uses Dr. Barbara Bergmann's Model ofLabor Market Overcrowding to test for 
gender discrimination in the legal profession. Bergmann's model suggests that 
stereotypes and society's perceptions about what is "normal" divide male and female 
lawyers into two separate labor markets such that 1) females are paid less than males 
and 2) male and female lawyers are segregated into different areas of practice--either by 
area of concentration or position within the firm. 
Two samples, one composed of 45 young lawyers and the other consisting of 400 lawyers 
(200 males and 260 females), are used to test these hypotheses. The results indicate that 
significant wage differentials do exist for young lawyers--females earn significantly less 
even after controlling for experience. While there is no significant evidence of crowding 
in the specific areas of practice, there is statistically significant evidence of crowding 
with respect to partnership status. 
( 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
Harvard Law School first admitted women in 1950. Harvard was not alone in its long-standing 
opposition to an open admissions policy. Notre Dame's law school waited until 1969 to begin 
enrolling women, and the law school at Washington and Lee University did not implement a similar 
policy until 1972 (Epstein, 50). Today females account for 40-50% of law school enrol1ment and 
around 22% of our nation's lawyers (ROUNDTABLE 2, 19). 
Despite evidence that no overt wage discrimination exists between the sexes, 54% of female 
lawyers (and 29% of male lawyers) feel that men have a greater chance of becoming involved with 
firm management (ROUNDTABLE 2, 21). Furthermore, when "Gilda" (a female attorney who 
'. 
responded on condition of anonymity) was asked "Do you know what it takes to make partner in your 
firm?", a male colleague replied, "A sex change". "Gilda" countered, "Good point"(ROUNDTABLE 
1,20). Still another female lawyer reports that the firm she is working for "actually discourages 
women from practicing law once they have started a family"(ROUNDTABLE 1, 19). Is it possible 
that pecuniary discrimination, which is il1egal, is being supplemented by other forms of 
discrimination and pressures against female lawyers? If so, how is it being manifested? 
This study will attempt to reconcile the views presented by academic theory with those expounded 
by members of the legal profession. Following reviews of discrimination theory and previous 
research, a section will be devoted to explaining the empirical model that is to be utilized in this 
paper. Results and policy implications will also be presented. 
II. AN OVERCROWDING MODEL OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN LAW: 
Labor market discrimination occurs whenever men and women of equal productivity and 
aspirations are treated differently in hiring, retention, training, and promotion practices (Hoffman, 2). 
Economists general1y agree on these principles, but they do not always agree on theoretical 
explanations of this phenomena. Perhaps this is because individual labor markets are unique. Also, it 
2 
may be that the explanations of labor market discrimination are as diverse as the disciplines that 
study it. Six general explanations include: 
1.	 neoclassical, based on models of statistical discrimination and investments in hwnan 
capital; 
2.	 social psychological, emphasizing socialization and internalized norms; 
3.	 institutional, emphasizing the intended and unintended consequences and inertia of 
organizational arrangements; 
4.	 cultural, emphasizing taken-for-granted notions of men's work and women's work, often 
shared by both men and women; 
5.	 political, stressing the different interests of male employers and employees with respect to 
maintaining the status quo; and 
6.	 patriarchaL, emphasizing the common interests of male workers and employers in 
mainta!n a sex-based division of labor (Bielby, 107). 
One economic theory that can potentially capture most of these effects is Dr. Barbara Bergmann's 
model of labor market overcrowding, and Bergmann's model serves as the central framework for this 
study. Rather than looking at a labor market as the sum of its parts, Bergmann argues that 
stereotypes and society's perceptions about what is "normal" actually divide labor markets into two 
separate labor markets--one for males and the other for females..:-in which the individuals are perfect 
substitutes. Bergmann's theory is summarized in Figure I on the following page (Blau/Ferber, 214). 
Suppose the undiscriminating market of (Hm), which pays wage w 0 experiences discrimination 
and divides into a market for those discriminated against (f) and one for the preferred co-workers 
(m). Demand is no longer in the form of DEMAND(Hm)' but is rather DEMANDf and 
DEMANDm. Jobs in the separate market (m) are filled by a restricted supply of labor (m) and 
wages for (m) increase. Also, members of (f) must "crowd" into a restricted number of positions if 
they want to remain in the market. As Figure 1 illustrates, pay differentials will develop whenever, 
relative to their respective supplies, DEMANDm is greater than DEMAND£- More females are 
"crowded" into a market that faces less demand. Lower wages for females result from each female 
attorney being less productive because she has less capital with which to work. As previously 
mentioned, those who remain in market (m) receive higher wages; members of(m) are more 
productive because each has more capital to work with. Thus, as seen in Figure 1, both groups are 
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Figure 1: A Model of Labor Market Overcrowding 
Labor market for male and female lawyers 
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paid according to their productivity. It is important to remember that group (f) is forced to be less 
productive--they are forced into a crowded market (Blau/Ferber, 212-15). 
In terms of the labor market for lawyers, the overcrowding model predicts that 1) female lawyers 
(f) will be paid less than their male counterparts (m), and that 2) a barrier exists between labor 
markets (f) and (m) which segregates female and male lawyers into different areas of practice. 
Whereas Bergmann's model directly suggests a testable hypothesis regarding male and female roles 
within the legal profession (crowding), it does not offer as obvious of an explanation for the causes of 
crowding. Other theories may provide greater insight into the causes of any apparent crowding. 
A. BECKER'S Economics of Discrimination 
On the demand side, female participation in the legal labor market (f) is influenced by employers, 
consumers and fellow employees. What causes these three groups to treat female lawyers as 
fundamentally different from their male counterparts? One ofthe pioneering theories of 
discrimination, developed by Dr. Gary S. Becker, provides further insight into this issue. In his I..h.e. 
Economics of Discrimination (1957, 1971), Becker theorizes that employers, employees and 
consumers have different "tastes" for discrimination which cause them to act "as if' they are "willing 
to pay something either directly or in the form of a reduced income to be associated with some 
persons instead of others"; the dollar value that each individual is willing to "pay" is called a 
discrimination coefficient (DC). Employers and consumers perceive net wages and net prices as 
relatively higher because they are "paying" for undesirable associations with the discriminated­
against person; their DC is positive. Similarly, discriminating employees perceive lower net wages 
because of the "disutility" associated with working with the discriminated-against co-worker, and 
therefore have a negative DC. Non-discriminators have a DC of zero. 
In terms of this study, ifwf is the wage received by female lawyers (the discriminated-against 
factor) and wm is the wage of male lawyers, assuming that productivity is equal, wf should equal 
wm. However, the full cost that a discriminating employer perceives when employing a female 
lawyer is (wf+ DC",mn)' Thus, if the male attorney receives wm' the discriminated against female 
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receives (wm - Deemp) (Becker, Econ of Disc, 14-15). At least in the short-run, the differences in 
DCs will result in wage differentials and job segregation across firms. 
Using the Neoclassical theories of marginal productivity and utility maximization, as well as the 
assumption of competition, Becker contends that firms with lower DCs should have lower production 
costs. Lower production costs give firms with lower DCs a comparative advantage. If the 
comparative advantage persists, ceteris paribus, it will drive firms with higher DCs out of the market 
and eliminate discrimination--firms will compete by lowering DCs until the DC for surviving firms is 
zero. 
However, the persistence of discrimination depends on the market structure. As the market 
becomes less competitive, employers can engage in higher degrees of discrimination without fearing 
cut-throat wage competition (BlauJFerber, 203-4). 
Within the legal profession, competition may be inhibited by several factors. Consumer and 
employee discrimination are two such factors. Even if an employer has no taste for discrimination, 
he/she may, in the name of profit-maximizing, be forced to discriminate when other employees or 
customers have discriminatory tastes (BlauJFerber, 1992). One example might involve firms 
specializing in labor law; union officials have been known to be reluctant and even opposed to 
working with female attorneys (ROUNDTABLE 2, 28). If unions refuse to be represented by a 
female, the productivity of the female lawyer is diminished. Rather than hiring a female attorney, the 
firm will opt for hiring a male; supply oflabor lawyers is restricted, and their wages increase. 
Becker's assumption of perfect competition is not maintained. 
As mentioned earlier, the Bergmann model predicts that female and male lawyers will be 
segregated into different areas of practice. If this is the case, what are the forces behind this sector­
specific segregation? On the supply-side, Becker relies on the Neoclassical theories of utility 
maximization and human capital theory. These theories suggest that an increase in the store of 
human capital through training and education will be undertaken by the employee or provided by the 
employer if the benefits exceed the cost. 
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There are two types of training: general training and firm-specific training. General training will 
increase an individual's productivity to the same extent no matter where he/she works. With firm­
specific training, as its name implies, skills cannot be transferred to another firm. Who pays for the 
training will likely depend on who receives the benefits. In most cases, the individual pays for 
general training. Since it is mutually beneficial, the cost of firm-specific training is often shared by 
both the employer and employee. Thus, because the employer bears part of the cost, he/she is 
concerned with the expected employment life of the employee--how long wi)) the firm benefit from 
its investment in the training (BlaulFerber, 164-67)? Between two equally qualified candidates, a 
profit-maximizing firm would hire or promote the employee with the longest expected employment 
life. Often this decision is based on group averages or stereotypes. (Decisions based on such averages 
will be discussed in the next section.) 
With respect to the legal profession, it is assumed that each individual starts out with similar 
general training--a law school degree. Although there may be differences with respect to experience-­
law journal, internship, and clerkship activities--when two individuals enter practice at the same level 
and at the same time, it is assumed that they are equally productive, ceteris paribus. When the job is 
secured, human capital (productivity) is enhanced by firm-specific training such as mentor-protege 
relationships, "power" lunches and the like. Becker postulates that profit-maximizers will invest in 
the employee with the longest expected employment life. Furthermore, individuals allocate both 
time and effort between market and non-market activities; and since women allocate more effort to 
home activities, they have less effort (relative to men) to allocate to work. Thus, women are less 
productive and should be paid accordingly (cited in Bielby). Following this line of reasoning, some 
argue that women cannot "hack it" in the more "demanding" areas of law, such as litigation. 
Bielby (1991) offers several alternative explanations for women being just as productive as men in 
the workplace even though they allocate more time to non-market, home activities: 1) some men 
choose not to draw on reserve stockpiles of effort, 2) physiological evidence supports the notion that 
humans have renewable energy sources--being active is stimulating, 3) as in Becker's theory, sex 
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roles are taken for granted, and 4) the allocation of work effort may not be a del iberate or conscious 
choice. 
Blau and Ferber (1992) also cast a shadow of doubt on Becker's Neoclassical theory. They point 
out that mentor-protege relationships are usually initiated by the experienced professional; if a field's 
senior members are mostly male, as is the case with law, a large majority of mentors will be male. 
Male mentors tend to choose male proteges. While no economic theory specifically explains why 
this happens, it has been suggested that male mentors feel uncomfortable and "unable to relate" to 
female proteges. Also, wives and colleagues may pressure them not to have female proteges 
(BlaulFerber, 199?). Similar to the influence of consumers' tastes for discrimination, a non­
discriminating mentor may be forced to act discriminatingly. Thus, males are favored as proteges 
and gain a human capital advantage. Specifically Michael J. Howlett Jr., a partner in a Chicago law 
firm, a former associate judge and special deputy outside counsel for the United States House of 
Representatives Ethics Committee (1988-89), points out that "Not enough of what we do generally in 
the practice oflaw is focused on how to mentor women associates....That is where I see a continuing 
glass ceiling or barrier (ROUNDTABLE 2, 25)". 
Research by Baron, et al suggests that when decision makers (employers) change more frequently 
and/or are younger, the chance of increasing the position of females in the labor que (ranking) is 
greater. Such industries are expected to integrate more rapidly (cited in Reskin). Law is not one 
such industry. In fact, some criticize it for being patriarchal (Epstein, 111). This also supports the 
preceding BlaulFerber argument. 
B. STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 
On the other hand, it is possible that discrimination is not just the result of discriminatory "tastes" 
or human capital choice. fnstead it may be the result of a market failure, namely imperfect 
information. The model of statistical discrimination assumes that employers and/or consumers face 
imperfect information and uncertainty regarding individuals' potential productivity. As they make 
hiring or promotional decisions, employers project their "average" beliefs about a particular group 
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onto an individual applicant who belongs to that particular group. As a result, individuals are 
discriminated against because they (the applicants) are believed to share some undesirable 
stereotypic characteristic. While it may seem contradictory, if on average an employer's stereotypic 
views are proven correct, the resulting decisions are not discriminatory under a strict definition of 
discrimination (BlaufFerber, 208-10). The actual result remains the same--some qual ified applicants 
are erroneously excluded from employment. 
Overcrowding theory would predict that the imperfect information decreases demand for female 
lawyers. Employers may believe that females do not have as high of an expected employment life as 
do their male cou~terparts and decide not to grant females the same opportunities of firm-specific 
training, job assignments or promotion that they offer to males. If, on average, these beliefs become 
reality the practice is not discriminatory. However, research by Viscusi, Blau and Kahn revealed that 
this does not seem to be the case--men and women have equal turnover rates, ceteris paribus (cited by 
Olson and Becker, footnote 14,627). Therefore, segregating male and female lawyers by area of 
practice or job assignment fits the strict definition of discrimination if employers make stereotypes 
based on erroneous information; it is a case of "irrational expectations". 
One other thing to consider when dealing with statistical discrimination is how it affects the 
employment decisions of the stereotyped group. Statistical discrimination may have feedback 
effects. These effects include actions and/or reactions of discriminated-against individuals that are 
influenced by the knowledge that they are indeed discriminated against; the result is a self-fulfilling 
prophesy (BlaulFerber, 208-10). For example, a female entering the legal profession may want to 
specialize in litigation. However, during an internship she learns that women have few opportunities 
for advancement in litigation firms. In order to avoid being trapped in a dead-end job, the female 
decides to specialize in public interest law. On the surface this decision reinforces the stereotypes 
that women are not tough enough to make it in litigation and that they are "soft-hearted". But, this 
surface analysis reverses the causation--which came first, the chicken or the egg? 
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m. Previous Research: 
Until now most of the literature and research has focused explicitly on the theory of wage 
differentials. A study by Craig A. Olson and Brian E. Becker took a different approach and 
examined the effect of gender on promotion and the returns to promotion (1983). Olson and Becker 
predicted the probability of promotion for men and women across all occupations during the years of 
1973-77, using data from the Quality of Employment Panel. 1973-77. Out of an original sample of 
1455 individuals who were over the age of 16 and working more than 20 hours per week, they used 
408 individuals. The restricted sample excluded individuals whose data was incomplete as well as 
those who were ei!her self-employed or had left their previous employer in 1973 (neither group had 
opportunities for promotion within the same firm for the years between 1973-1977). 
After explanations of promotions, wages and sample attrition, Olson and Becker constructed a 
three-equation model. The promotion equation captured both observable and unobservable 
components of expected performance. After controlling for occupation, education, tenure, labor 
force experience, union status, firm size, attrition, marital status and region of employment, men and 
women do have significant differences in promotion. A gender variable revealed that being female 
decreased the likelihood of promotion; and even when they are promoted, women receive promotions 
of less significance. These different and unequal promotional paths result in job segregation. 
After examining the impact that the promotion process had on wage differentials, they revealed 
that: 
[O]ur results indicate that women (men) would have received substantially more 
(fewer) promotions had they been held to the same standards as men (women). 
Although the female-male wage gap narrowed by about 6 percent between 1973 and 
1977, it would have narrowed even further--by 8.6 to 9.2 percent--ifmen and women 
had been promoted on the basis of the same cri teria (641). 
Concluding that men and women face fundamentally different promotion processes, Olson and 
Becker stated that: 
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[U]nequal access to opportunities, rather than unequal returns, constitutes the 
principal source of male-female differences in employment outcomes (641). 
These findings support Bergmann's overcrowding hypothesis. 
The theoretical implication of Bergmann also seems to be supported by a recent study that was 
conducted by Dr. David N. Laband and Dr. Bernard F. Lentz. In their study of the legal profession, 
they used a LOGIT regression to test the probability of an attorney achieving partnership. Probability 
of partnership was a positive and significant function of experience and law school performance 
(232). Using a dummy variable for gender, they received a significantly negative coefficient for 
female. However,. controlling for family status decreased the significance and the value of the 
variable. Finding that an individual's role in the family is more important than gender in predicting 
partnership, they concluded that there was no sex discrimination. However, another possibility is 
that feedback effects are responsible for determining family status as well as type of practice. 
Laband and Lentz also;examined wage ditTerentials and promotion possibilities for female and male 
lawyers. No significant ditferences appeared. 
Furthermore, they used job-description variables as a means of testing for covert discrimination. 
Subjective ratings of potential for advancement, work atmosphere, level of responsibility and office 
politics served as proxies for covert discrimination. Using OLS regression analysis, Laband and 
Lentz found that negative or low job description ratings were more significant for females than 
males. They concluded that "sex discrimination against women in the legal profession is a charge 
sustained by little tangible but much intangible evidence (Laband, 1993, 253)". 
Laband and Lentz's results offer empirical support for the predictions of Bergmann's 
overcrowding theory--wage differentials do not exist on a same-job basis, but females and males do 
appear to have different roles within the legal community. Additionally, the "intangible margins" may 
possibly be explained by statistical discrimination. Perhaps feedback effects are responsible for 
determining family status as well as type of practice. 
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They also tried to detennine whether or not female attorneys either self-selected (feedback 
effects) or were channeled into certain areas of practice (Laband, 248). Using a multivariate 
approach, Laband and Lentz ran "regression models of the detenninants of time allocations to 16 
subfields of law (Laband, 248)." Forty-three explanatory variables were identified, and the regression 
was run on 1984 data for 427 associate lawyers. Their results found "virtually no evidence of gender­
based differences with respect to the self-reported percent of time respondents spent on various types 
of law (248)". Even though their results were not significant, it is interesting to note that for certain 
areas, the female coefficient was negative. These areas include: antitrust, labor/employment, natural 
resources, patent/trademark/copyright, public utility and tortslinsurance law. 
IV. Research Hypotheses: 
This study uses Dr. Bergmann's overcrowding hypothesis as a theoretical framework with which 
to extend the work of Laband and Lentz. Bergmann's theory suggests the following hypotheses: 
1) crowding in the legal labor market leads to wage differentials between male and 
female lawyers; 
2) separate labor markets for male and female lawyers exist in the fonn ofjob 
segregation by type of law practiced (area of concentration); 
3) male and female lawyers are segregated with respect to position within the finn. 
These hypotheses will be tested using descriptive statistics, cross-tab analysis as well as OLS and 
LOGlT regression analysis. While two sets of data will be used to test the hypotheses, both data 
sources will incorporate some of the variables included in the Laband and Lentz research. 
Does crowding exist? 
A. WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
1. Model 
One of the indirect implications of Bergmann's model is that wage differentials develop between 
the discriminated against (female) and the preferred (male) segments ofa specific labor market (legal 
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labor market). A sample of 45 legal professionals (21 females and 24 males), obtained from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLS V), will be used to test this hypothesis. The NLSY 
database contains infonnation on 12,686 individuals; this data was collected by means of annual 
personal interviews conducted by U.S. Census personnel between the years of 1979 and 1990 (Center 
for Human Resources, 1992). Due to the time period covered by the NLSY, this sample consists of 
relatively young lawyers. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis will be used to test for statistically significant 
differences in annual wage income between male and female lawyers. As implied by Bergmann's 
theory, it is expec~ed that being female has a negative effect on the amount of an individual's 
wages/salary because women are "crowded" into lower paying jobs. A dummy variable for gender 
(1 =female; O=male) is predicted to have a sign ificant and negative coefficient. In order to better 
explain differences in wages/salary, I will try to control for work experience using proxy variables-­
the number of hours worked during the 1991 calendar year (HOURS) and age (AGE). As the 
number of hours worked (age) increases, so should the wages/salary. Positive and significant signs 
are expected. 
Furthermore, the NLSY divides marital status into three groups: never married, married with 
spouse present and other. For the purposes of this study, the variables will be recoded into a dummy 
variable: MARRIED equals 1 if the respondent is married with his/her spouse present, and 0 if 
otherwise. Human capital theory indicates that marriage can impact the number of hours an 
individual devotes to the workplace. It may increase the number of hours worked as the individual 
substitutes leisure time for an increase in income. This may occur if the individual is the principal 
wage earner for a family. On the other hand, marriage may result in a decrease in hours worked as 
the individual substitutes away from work and towards time spent in non-labor market activities. In 
this case, the individual values time spent out ofthe labor market more than he/she values 
participation in the professional workplace. This study will use the marriage dummy variable as a 
control variable. Comparisons will be made with the results of Laband and Lentz. 
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2. Results 
OLS regression results are listed in Table 1. Model A includes all ofthe variables: hours 
worked, gender, marital status and age. Model B does not control for marital status. And, Model C is 
a simple regression with age and gender for independent variables. In all three models, the 
dependent variable is the amount of the respondent's annual wages/salary for the 1991 calendar year. 
Table 1: OLS regression: Dependent variable--Annual wages/salary (1991). 
T-statistics are given in parentheses. 
Significance: *=.10 **=.05 ***=.01 
Independent 
Variable: Model A Model B Model C 
FEMALE 
AGE 
HOURS 
MARRIED 
constant 
adj R2 
Model F-stat 
n 
-17129.87 
(-1.729 *) 
4478.46 
( 1.938 *) 
4.71
 
(.566 )
 
5935.52
 
(.590 )
 
-91103.52 
.128 
2.25 * 
34 
-17605.91 
.. (-1.802 *) 
4210.44 
( 1.878 *) 
6.17 
( .801 ) 
-83216.07 
.147 
2.95 ** 
34 
-16539.18 
(-1.720 *) 
4603.42 
( 2.119 **) 
-81856.67 
.157 
4.17 ** 
34 
Unlike the results of Laband and Lentz, all three models have a significantly negative coefficient 
for the female gender variable (FEMALE) . This supports the hypothesis implied in Bergmann's 
theory: crowding in the legal labor market does lead to wage differentials between males and 
females. Specifically, in Model C being female reduces a lawyers annual wages/salary by 
$16,539.18, ceteris paribus (See Table 2). What's more, AGE is the most significant of the proxies 
for experience--in Model C, one additional year of experience brings about an increase of $4603.42 
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Table 2: 
ESTIMATED SALARIES
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in the individual's annual wages/salary. HOURS worked and marital status (MARRIED) do not 
have significant effects on an individuals earnings. 
The insignificance of the marital status variable is noteworthy because of its relationship with the 
results of Laband and Lentz's research. In order to approach the problem in a manner closer to that 
used by Laband and Lentz, who included family status variables [number of children and marital 
status] (237), an interaction variable was created between gender and marital status (FEMMARRY). 
Even though Laband and Lentz found no significant difference between gender and family status, a 
recent survey conducted by The National Law Journal found that, "... more than six out of 10 women, 
compared with ju~t two in 10 men, said that their careers have suffered in relation to their colleagues 
whose 'significant others' do not work full time.... --if only because, as the respondents agree, women 
have primary responsibility for the children"(1993). This study agreed with The National Law 
Journal, and as is consistent with the previous discussion of labor market participation, expected that 
being female and married has a negative effect on wages/salary. This was not the case; when 
FEMMARRY was included in regression analysis, it was not significant. It seems that marriage 
does not significantly affect wages/salary. On the other hand, it may be that the young ages of the 
NLSY respondents biases these results. 
Future research may shed some additional light on the determination of wages/salaries by 
including variables for different areas of concentration, firm size and urban/rural locations. These 
may also playa part through supply and demand as well as cost of living mechanisms. 
How is crowding manifested? 
Data from the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (1992), a state-by-state compilation of 
professional biographies for lawyers in private practice, was coded to create variables that represent 
areas of concentration, position with current employer, firm size, geographic location and 
educational background. Four hundred lawyers, two hundred females (an over-representation) and 
two hundred males, were randomly selected from all fifty states. The exclusion of in-house corporate 
attorneys and those employed by the government is likely to bias my results, particularly because 
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female lawyers are expected to be disproportionately represented in these sectors (ROUNDTABLE 2, 
19). Even so, this data makes it easier to compare my results to those of Laband and Lentz. It is 
possible that the MDH data will provide more reliable results because the sample is representative of 
the national population oflawyers. (See Appendix A for a complete discussion of the data selection 
process.) 
A: OCCUPATlONAL CROWDING 
1. Model 
Descriptive st~tistics and cross-tabs will be used to examine the distribution oflawyers in certain 
areas of practice. Firm size will also be examined because certain types of law may be more likely to 
be practiced in large firms. Also, a greater proportion of female lawyers are expected to work in 
small firms or solo practices--this seems to have been the general trend, with female lawyers 
reporting greater responsibility and a greater chance of partnership in such firms (Deakin, 1993). 
Proof for crowding will include significant gender differences among occupational distributions by 
specialty. Whereas the NLSY analysis will provide indirect evidence of possible crowding in the 
legal labor market, the MDH analysis will provide insight into the specific ways in which crowding 
may be manifested. 
Theory as well as personal accounts offered by the ROUNDTABLE participants predict that 
female lawyers concentrate their practices in the areas of general/family practice [GP-FAM], 
corporate/finance law [CORP-FIN], estate/probate and tax law [EST-TAX] and criminal law 
[CRIM]. Societal stereotypes have long cast women in nurturing and caretaking roles-­
characteristics that are thought to be indicative of family law (Epstein, 102). Similar reasoning may 
explain the over-representation offemales in the practice of estate/probate and tax law (Epstein, 
102). As was previously mentioned, female lawyers are expected to be disproportionately 
represented in corporate in-house legal operations (ROUNDTABLE 2, Bellows, 19). Similarly, this 
study anticipates that females are also over-represented in corporate/finance practice. Unlike the 
previous areas of concentration, criminal practice does not involve typically "female" topics. Instead, 
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it has been hypothesized that female lawyers may have a significant presence in this area of practice 
because criminal law is viewed as the "lowest form of courtroom work" (Epstein, 106). Research by 
Laband and Lentz offers empirical support for these predictions; even though the coefficients were 
not statistically significant, the above-mentioned areas of concentration were positively related to a 
female dummy variable (249). 
On the other hand, fewer women are expected to spend a significant amount of time workmg on 
cases in the following areas: litigation and appellate work [LIT-APPEJ, labor/employment law 
[LABOR], environmental concerns [ENVIR] and copyright/patent/intellectual property law 
[PATENT]. Presllmably litigation and appellate work is viewed as an area of concentration requiring 
typically "male virtues" that result itt a confident and aggressive courtroom presence 
(ROUNDTABLE 2, Howlett, 24). Clients and decision makers inside fi rms do not expect as good of 
results from a female lawyer as they do from a male. Furthermore, female attorneys with these 
attributes may actually be looked down upon if they do exhibit such qual ities: 
If they are tough in the courtroom, then they are' not pleasant to work with as a 
partner. And if they are not tough in the courtroom, then they are a lovely person to 
work with, but nobody would want to be represented by them in court 
(ROUNDTABLE 2, Weiss, 26). 
As mentioned earlier, labor and employment law tends to be male-dominated because the 
leadership of labor unions tends to be male-dominated. Recently participation by female lawyers has 
been increasing, but only slowly (ROUNDTABLE 2, Fox, 28). As for the ENVlR and PATENT 
classifications, males may be more dominant in these areas of concentration because of the scientific 
component--science has long been a stereotypically "male" field of study. Laband and Lentz found 
negative coefficients for their female dummy variable when it was regressed against these four areas. 
(249). My study maintains these predictions. 
The areas of civil practice [CIVIL], malpractice law [MAL], personal injury and workers' 
compensation law [PI], international practice [INTL] and insurance defense practice [INSDEF] are 
uncertain. First, the area of civil practice is very broad. It also includes a mixture of functions some 
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of which are traditionally thought of as "male" or "female". Second, the areas of malpractice, 
personal injury and insurance defense are highly specialized areas of concentration--Iawyers may not 
report these specific areas as the focus oftheir practices. Furthermore, these areas often involve 
specialized medical and business components. As mentioned earlier, males are more traditionally 
found in areas dealing with medicine, and females are expected to be found in areas dealing with 
corporate/finance matters. It is hard to tell which subject area will dominate and even harder to tell 
whether or not lawyers of a particular gender will dominate these areas of practice. For these reasons 
no predictions are made. 
2. Results 
Generally, tests for "gender" crowding by area of concentration were consistent with those of 
previous research; there was no significant evidence of crowding. Individual cross-tabs were run 
between the FEMALE variable and each area of concentration. Results are reported in Table 3. As 
forecasted by theory and the Laband and Lentz research, the areas of corporate-finance and general­
family practice did contain a larger percentage of women. While the difference was not significant in 
the corporate-finance area, it was significant at the .10 level for the area of general-family law. 
Criminal and estate-tax practices had been hypothesized to be significantly female areas of 
concentration, but those areas were numerically dominated by males (70.6% male and 56.7% male, 
respectively). 
Of the areas that were hypothesized to be predominately male, only litigation-appellate law 
contained a larger percentage of men than women; the difference was not statistically significant. 
Contrary to prediction, the areas of environmental, labor and patent law had more women than men. 
Again, the differences were not statistically significant. Perhaps these differences are due to a 
combination of an increase in young female attorneys that have entered the job market recently (as 
identified by cross-tab analysis of EXP--experience) and the increase in demand for lawyers in areas 
like environmental, labor and patent law (USN&WR, 110). 
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TABLE 3: Cross-tabs. FEMALE and AREA(s) OF CONCENTRATION 
AREA OF EXPECTED CHI­
CONCENTRATTON DOMINANCE % MALE % FEMALE SQUARE 
CIVIL ( 166) ? 50.0 50.0 .0000 
CORP-FIN (209) F 49.3 50.7 .0401 
CRlM ( 17) F 70.6 29.4 2.2116 
ENVIR ( 19) M 42.1 57.9 .2210 
EST-TAX ( 60) F 56.7 43.3 .9608 
GP-FAM ( 95) F 42.1 57.9 2.7058* 
INSDEF ( 13) ? 46.2 53.8 .0000 
INTL ( 15) ? 46.7 53.3 .0000 
LABOR ( 14) M 42.9 57.1 .0740 
LIT-APPE ( 129) M 51.9 48.1 .1831 
MAL ( 8) ? 50.0 50.0 .0000 
PATENT ( 10) M 30.0 70.0 .9231 
PI ( 29) ? 724 27.6 5.3537** 
parentheses contain the number of sample lawyers indicating a concentration in the specified 
area; total number does not equal 800 because some lawyers only listed one area of concentration 
n =400 
* = significant at .10 level 
** = significant at .05 level 
Surprisingly, the area of concentration with the greatest significant difference between male and 
female lawyers was one that had no previous prediction--personal injury and workers' compensation 
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[PI]. Reporting a composition of72.4% males and 27.6% females, it was significant at the .05 level. 
Perhaps the medical content and often litigious nature of this type of practice has generally 
discouraged women from entering, or has otherwise kept them out of this area. Another possibility is 
that this type of practice requires a signi"ficant amount of experience, and the majority of female 
lawyers have not been practicing long enough to get the experience that is necessary to specialize in 
this area. 
Overall statistically significant support of the crowding hypothesis on the basis of area of 
concentration is weak. Apparently male and female lawyers are not significantly segregated into 
different areas of ~oncentration. However, complications with the MDH data may have influenced 
the results. The subjective nature used to report an individual's areas of concentration poses two 
potential problems. First, in addition to being a reference source, the Martindale-Hubbell Law 
Directory can also be used as an advertising device. As such, firms and individuals may try to 
maximize the probability of getting new business by being very general in describing their practices. 
Or, firms and individuals wishing to increase their caseload in a particular area of practice may be 
very specific in describing their practices. Second, whether or not an individual declares a particular 
area ofconcentration depends in part on how he/she defines that particular specialty. For example, 
what one individual considers to be a civil practice may be considered by another to be a general­
family practice. Perhaps these data complications have biased my results. 
Another possibility: certain areas of concentration are more likely to be practiced in large firms. If 
female lawyers are, as Deakin (1993) suggests, more likely to practice in smaller firms, then they 
may also be less likely to specialize in these areas. To test for possible indirect effects of firm size on 
area of concentration, firm size variables were recoded to create BIGFIRM, a dummy variable that 
indicated firms having 60 or more attorneys. Cross-tabs of BIGFIRM with each area of 
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concentration and with FEMALE produced mixed results. Only three areas of concentration had 
significant differences between large and small/medium finns. Of the lawyers concentrating in the 
area of general-family practice, 72.6% worked in small or medium finns and 27.4% worked in large 
finns, at the .05 level of significance. Considered together with the cross-tabs between FEMALE 
and general-family practice, this appears to be consistent with Deakin as well as Laband and Lentz. 
On the other hand; the results for the female-dominated area of international law do not uphold this 
hypothesis. 46.79% of those with a concentration in international law were found to be in 
small/medium finns and 53.3% were in large finns; this was significant at the .01 level. Again, no 
concrete conc1usiQns can be drawn. It may be that finn size plays a role in detennining partnership 
status (Deakin), but not in detennining area(s) of concentration. This will be examined in the next 
section. 
8: PARTNERSHIP 
1. Model 
In addition to examining areas of concentration, the MDH data will be used to examine a lawyer's 
position within the finn. Division of labor within a law finn occurs between partner and associate 
levels. Generally, partnership status is detennined after 7 1/2 to 9 1/2 years with a finn 
(ROUNDTABLE 1, 17); it has been detennined that after ten years, 59% of males and only 23% of 
females become partners (ROUNDTABLE 3,15). If "gender" crowding is present, it is expected that 
cross-tabs and regression analysis will reveal a statistical significance on the basis of gender. 
Specifically, a negative relationship is expected between partnership and a female dummy variable 
(I =female; O=male). 
Theoretically, the probability of a lawyer achieving partnership status depends on human capital 
investment, experience and other criteria: 
PARTNER = f(HUMCAP, EXPERIENCE, OTHER) 
The actual variables to be used in this study are presented in Table 4. Human capital influences 
include law school prestige [TOPQUART, 2ndQUART, 3rdQUART], law school perfonnance 
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Table 4: Determinants of Partnership 
VARIABLE 
PARTNER 
FEMALE 
EXP 
EXPSQ 
FS-l 
FS-2 
FS-3 
FS-4 
FS-5 
FS-6 
FS-7 
BIGFIRM 
TOPQUART 
2ndQUART 
3rdQUART 
HONORS 
REV 
CLERK 
WEST 
MIDWEST 
SOUTH 
NORTH 
DEfINITION 
Partnership status; (1 = partner; 0 = otherwise) 
Gender identified as female; (1 = female; 0 = male) 
Experience; 92-BAR, with BAR = year of first admittance to bar
 
EXP * EXP
 
Firm consists of2-3 lawyers; (1 = firm size of2-3; 0 = otherwise)
 
Firm consists of 4-9 lawyers; (1 = firm size of 4-9; 0 = otherwise)
 
Firm consists of 10-20 lawyers; (1 = firm size of 10-20; 0 = otherwise)
 
Firm consists of21-30 lawyers; (1 = firm size of21-30; 0 = otherwise)
 
Firm consists of 31-60 lawyers; (1 = firm size of 31-60; 0 = otherwise)
 
Firm consists of61-90 lawyers; (1 = firm size of61-90; 0 = otherwise)
 
Firm consists of90+ lawyers; (1 = firm size of90+; 0 = otherwise)
 
Firm consists of 60+ lawyers; (l=firm size of60+; 0 = otherwise)
 
Law school is ranked in top quartile; (1 = top; 0 = otherwise)
 
Law school is ranked in second quartile; (1 = second; 0 = otherwise)
 
Law school is ranked in third quartile; (1 = third; 0 = otherwise)
 
Graduated law school with honors; (1 = honors; 0 = otherwise)
 
Worked on law review during law school; (1 = review; 0 = otherwise)
 
Worked as law clerk during law school or the year following the
 
completion of law school; (1 = clerk; 0 = otherwise)
 
Practicing in Western geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)
 
Practicing in Midwestern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)
 
Practicing in Southern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)
 
Practicing in the Northern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)
 
[HONORS], law review experience [REV] and clerkship experience [CLERK]. Experience is 
measured as the number of years in practice [EXP]. To account for the likelihood of partnership 
status increasing at a decreasing rate with respect to experience, EXPSQ will also be included. 
Finally, gender [FEMALE], firm size [FS-l, FS-2, FS-3, FS-4, FS-5, FS-6, FS-7 and BIGFIRM] 
and geographical location [WEST, MIDWEST, NORTH, SOUTH] are included. 
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Law review experience and extra-curriculars are included because of their voluntary nature; the 
individual law student actively chooses to participate in these activities as a way enhancing hislher 
future performance. This additional general training is expected to be positively related to 
partnership. 
This study uses law school prestige, as determined by the US. News & World Report's quartile 
ranking of the nation's law schools. It is expected that going to a more prestigious law school will 
enhance an individual's chance of making partner. These results will be compared to those of Laband 
and Lentz. Instead of using an established system for ranking law school, Laband and Lentz relied 
on the respondent~' subjective opinions as to whether their law schools were "very prestigious", 
"somewhat prestigious", "not very prestigious" or "not prestigious" (256). Thus, the results achieved 
using the law school ranking and .MIlli. data are expected to be more reliable. 
Years in practice (EXP) are expected to be significantly and positively related to partnership 
status. However, EXPSQ is expected to have negative and significant coefficient. This would 
indicate that the positive effect of experience on partnership inc'reases at a decreasing rate--as an 
individual spends more time with a firm in the capacity of a non-partner, the likelihood of becoming 
a partner increases at a slower rate. Eventually a leveling off occurs. 
Laband and Lentz suggest that firm size can affect a lawyer's chance of becoming a partner. Their 
results indicate that a greater probability of partnership exists in smaller firms (238), a finding that is 
consistent with current trends as identified by Deakin (1993). This study tests the same hypotheses. 
Geographic location may also influence partnership. As the National Law Journal-West 
Publishing Company survey results revealed, "[g]enerally, more women in Los Angeles and 
Washington said they felt their firms provided equal opportunities than did women in Boston or 
Chicago (Lewin, 15)". Regional differences were also reported regarding the complications that 
female lawyers face because of male-only clubs (Lewin, 15). 
While this study was limited by data, the literature discusses other variables that might affect the 
likelihood of becoming a partner. In future research, it might be helpful to evaluate the effects that 
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the following variables have on partnership: years with present employer (firm), full- or part-time 
employment, billable hours, ability to bring in business, on-the-job extras as well as sociological 
variables such as race, marital status and number of children. The first two are direct quantitative 
measures of experience and are traditionally positively related to partnership. Likelihood of 
becoming a partner is positively related to full-time employment, but negatively related to part-time 
status (Lewin, 15). 
Since the ability to bring in business and billable hours are often used as important measures of 
productivity, they are also taken into account as a firm's management is making decisions regarding 
partnership. A po~itive relationship would be predicted. 
On-the-job extras that come as an individual gains experience with a firm (firm-specific training) 
can also positively influence the likelihood of becoming a partner. Included in such "extras" are 
mentorship opportunities, "power" lunches or after-work cocktails and sporting activities. All of these 
increase an associate'scontact with partners and clients. The theory ofBlaulFerber, the testimony of 
John Howlett, Jr. and the results of a National Law Journal-West Publishing Company survey, in 
which 918 female lawyers were questioned, all indicate that women are less likely than men to have 
these opportunities (BlaulFerber, 1992; ROUNDTABLE 2, 25; Lewin, 15). Specific examples 
involve male-only clubs, which are "supported by one in five ofth[e] law firms" that had lawyers 
participating in the above-mentioned survey (15). 
Race, marital status and number ofchildren may affect an individual's probability of being 
partner. Race would be expected to have a negative effect if the individual is a minority. 
Furthermore, marital status and number of children may indirectly affect an individual's tastes 
for/against hours spent in the workplace (See the discussion of work-force participation on pages 9­
10). Interaction variables between these variables and gender might also produce interesting results 
with respect to predicting partnership status. 
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2. Results 
To begin assessing the relationship between gender and status within the finn, I eliminated solo 
practitioners because they have no opportunity for further advancement. In order to accurately 
account for the fact that partnership is generally granted between 7 1/2 and 9 1/2 years 
(ROUNDTABLE 1, 17), and to eliminate outliers that were detected by the cross-tabs analysis, I 
decided to further restrict the sample to those lawyers with between 6 and 20 years of experience. 
This reduces the sample size to 226 (99 males and 127 females). Only results obtained using the 
restricted sample will be reported here. 
Bi-variate cros~-tab analysis between FEMALE and PARTNER did reveal asignificant 
relationship. Referring to Table 5, 74.7% of the male lawyers are partners, compared to 57.7% of the 
female lawyers. The difference is significant at the .01 level. 
In hopes of better understanding the magnitude of the relationship, I switched to multi-variate 
regression analysis. LOGIT analysis was chosen because of the dichotomous dependent variable 
(PARTNER). Unlike OLS regression analysis, the LOGIT coefficients cannot be treated like 
probability values. However, the signs and significance of the coefficients can be analyzed in much 
the same way as they are in OLS. LOGIT results are presented in Table 6. 
Model A, the complete model, includes all of the variables that are expected to effect partnership 
status. In Model B, the finn size variables are recoded into the dummy variable BIGFIRM; only the 
law school variable of TOPQUART remains; variables indicating an individual's geographic 
location are eliminated; and the human capital variables of HONORS, REV and CLERK are 
removed. Model C evaluates the effects of gender (FEMALE), experience (EXP and EXPSQ) and 
law school rank (TOPQUART) on partnership. These changes and individual results will be 
discussed later. 
In general these results support the crowding hypothesis--male and female lawyers are segregated 
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Table 5: 
PARTNERSHIP STATUS BY GENDER
 
(restricted sample) 
II MALE II FEMALE 
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Table 6--LOGIT REGRESSION: Dependent variable--PARTNER 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Significance Level: ·=.10 ··=.05 **·=.01 
Independent 
Variable Model A 
FEMALE - .7677 •• 
(.3812) 
EXP 1.2913··· 
(.2863) 
EXPSQ - .0438**· 
(.0112) 
FS-I .3473 
(.7144) . 
FS-2 .2972 
(.5893) 
FS-3 .1219 
(.5708) 
FS-4 -7308 
(.6543) 
FS-5 .1697 
(.6376) 
FS-6 1.5482 • 
(.9498) . 
BlGFlRM 
TOPQUART .5601 
(.5836) 
2ndQUART -.8638 
(.5767) 
3rdQUART -.0939 
(.6338) 
HONORS -3458 
(.4382) 
REV -0921 
(.4370) 
CLERK .4700 
(.6437) 
MIDWEST .5202 
(.5355) 
SOUTH .0994 
(.4909) 
NORTH -0082 
(.5227) 
constant -7.5072··· 
-2 log likelihood 218.729 
Model Chi-Square 73.793··· 
sample size 226 
Model B 
- .5969 • 
( .35 II) 
1.1980··· 
( .2641) 
- .0398··· 
( .0104) 
.0169 
(.4089) 
.7755 •• 
(.3499) 
-7.2699··· 
230.015 
62.507··· 
226 
Model C 
- .5859 • 
( .3485) 
1.2000··· 
( .2641) 
- .0399**· 
( .0104) 
.7975* ..... 
(.3401) 
-7.2752··· 
230.084 
62.438··· 
226 
wIth respect to posItIOn wlthm the finn, ceterIS paribus FEMALE has the expected negative SIgn, 
and it is a statIstically significant predictor of partnership status. ThIs relatIonship is maintained even 
after controlling for geographical location, finn size, experience and human capital influences. As is 
consistent with human capital theory and the findings of Laband and Lentz, both EXP and EXPSQ 
are extremely significant. 
Model A also reveals that law school, geographic region and other human capital measures 
(HONORS, REV and CLERK) do not significantly affect the prediction of partnership status. In 
order to conserve degrees of freedom, Model B drops several insignificant variables. These include 
sets ofdummy vaIjables for finn size, human capital investment and geographic location. Before 
they were dropped, the groups of variables were tested to see if, as groups, they significantly affected 
the prediction power of the equation. The significance ofthe changes in chi-square and the degrees 
of freedom were evaluated. No statistically significant differences were found 
The relative insignificance of the human capital variables leads me to believe that once a lawyer is 
hired, he/she is viewed as an equal among hislher peers. Although general training may be 
responsible for getting the job, there is no evidence in these results that the general training helps a 
lawyer achieve partnership. Perhaps finn-specific training is more important. This finding would 
offer support for the results of the National Law Journal-West Publishing Company survey and the 
BlaulFerber research. Unfortunately, there is no way for me to directly test this hypothesis. 
Ofthe three dummy variables which capture the quality oflaw school, only TOPQUART was 
retained in Model B. This was done to maintain the theoretical integrity of the model. Furthennore, 
it is possible that the ranked "quality" of the law school affects future perfonnance more than the 
individual's perfonnance in law school. TOPQUART is significant at the .05 level in Model Band 
the .01 level in Model C. 
With the exception of FS-6, none of the finn size variables are significant. This is consistent with 
preliminary cross-tab analysis of partner and finn size, controlling for gender. Since finn size was 
implicated as an important detenninant of partnership by Laband and Lentz as well as Deakin, and 
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because FS-6 was significant at the .10 level, a dummy variable (BIGFIRM) that indicates finns 
with 60 or more attorneys was added to the equation. Unlike the previous predictions, BIGFIRM is 
not statistically significant. 
So, what do the LOGIT results reveal about "gender" crowding by position within the law finn? 
One way to answer this question more definitively is to see the LOGIT cumulative distribution 
function 1 and the estimated LOGIT coefficients to test the accuracy of prediction for Model C. For 
each of the 226 lawyers, an estimated probability was calculated. A probability of more than (less 
than) .50 is a prediction of being a partner (non-partner). Accordingly, Model C has an error rate of 
27%, with 44 Type I errors and 17 Type II errors. 
In order to make specific estimates regarding the probability of being a partner, the independent 
variables must be assigned definite values. For example, assume that the respondent has 10 years of 
experience (EXP = 10 and EXPSQ = 100) and went to a top quartile law school (TOPQUART = 1). 
Using the logistic cumulative distribution function, it is estimated that a male lawyer has a 63.1 % 
probability of being a partner; a female with the same qualifica·tions has an estimated probability of 
48.7%. Model C predicts that the male is a partner, while the female is not. Being female apparently 
reduces a lawyer's chapces of being a partner by 14.4 percentage points, ceteris paribus. When other 
assumptions are made regarding the values of the independent variables, the computed gender 
differences are similar. The effect is generally around 12 percentage points. As Bergmann's 
crowding hypothesis suggests, male and female lawyers are segregated according to position within 
the finn. 
On an interesting side note, the control variable for law school prestige, TOPQUART, has a 
highly significant impact on the probability of becoming a partner for both males and females. Using 
the same assumptions from above, a male (female) who had not gone to a top quartile law school 
would have an estimated probability of 43.5% (30.0%). The probability of being a partner decreases 
by nearly 20 percentage points! While this study was not able to identify the interaction effects 
between gender and law school prestige, cross-tab analysis of the law school variables with 
FEMALE indicated that males were significantly more likely to graduate from a law school in the 
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top quartile (x2 = 3.646**). On the other hand, females were more likely to graduate from a law 
school in the third quartile (X2 = 6.396***). These results are similar to those of Laband and Lentz, 
who found more males in the top half, and more females in the bottom half (256). 
I can think of two instances in which such law school segregation might occur. First, gender 
discrimination on the part of admission committees at law schools may give male students an 
advantage. This would be an example of the direct effects of statistical discrimination (imperfect 
information). Or, self-segregation and feedback effects may lead women to enroll in less prestigious 
schools. Conditions that might influence feedback effects include parental and societal pressures as 
well as the knowl~dge that, until recently, many of the prestigious law schools were actively opposed 
to enrolling female students (Epstein, 50). Fearing disapproval, lack of financial support or 
considerable discrimination, females may choose to enroll in less prestigious schools. As 
manifestations of statistical discrimination, these feedback effects reinforce the stereotype that 
female law students are not as smart or as tough as their male counterparts (Epstein, 1981). 
Thus, the cross-tab analysis and TOPQUART's significance indicate that self-segregation into a 
less prestigious law school, as a result of feedback effects, may adversely affect the female lawyer's 
quest for partnership. This is not direct, but indirect in that it gives the male who graduated from a 
prestigious school an advantage. 
Attitudes-origins of crowding? 
1. Model 
In an attempt to uncover the origins of crowding--what causes the negative sign on the FEMALE 
variable in the preceding analyses--a set of attitudinal responses from the NLSY was evaluated. 
Eleven questions were asked about control, self-esteem and family attitudes (See appendix A, pp. 2­
3 for a list of the questions). It is expected that male respondents are more likely than their female 
counterparts to feel a sense of control over their actions and the directions that their lives are taking 
(attitudes of control and self-esteem). Also, it is expected that males are more likely to favor 
traditional roles for females within the family unit (family attitudes). However, it is not clear if this 
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difference will be statistically significant. Uncertainty arises because the sample is small and because 
the sample is composed ofyoung attomeys--a group that has, in general, been exposed to greater 
gender equality in both the home and educational environment. 
2. Results 
Overall males and females did not differ significantly with respect to attitudes of control. As a 
group, the young lawyers felt that they were in control of their plans from beginning to end. 
However, the results on self-esteem statements were mixed. Surprisingly, 100% of the females 
responded that they disagree/strongly disagree with the following statements: 1) "I feel that I am a 
person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others", and 2) "I am able to do things as well as 
most other people". Cross-tab analysis found that these differences, with respect to gender, were 
significant with X2 = 2.81 *. This implies that feedback effects may indirectly playa strong role in 
the decisions of these young female lawyers. The societal forces that shape these females' sense of 
self-esteem may direct choices regarding law school, area of cortcentration, firm size as well as many 
other career-related decisions. 
On the other hand, cross-tab analysis of family attitudes and gender provide different conclusions. 
The following statements had a significant number of males agreeing/strongly agreeing with them: 
1) "A woman's place is in the home, not in the office or shop", and 2) "A wife who carries out her 
full family responsibilities doesn't have time for outside employment". The differences were 
significant with X2 = 2.81 * and X2 = 6.06***, respectively. While the presence of a statistically 
significant difference is somewhat discouraging, a closer examination is needed. For both statements 
100% of the females disagreed/strongly disagreed; 87.5% (75.0%) of the male respondents 
disagreed /strongly disagreed with statement 1 (2). This leaves only 12.5% (25.0%) of the males 
who agreed/strongly agreed with the statements. The relatively low percentages of males agreeing 
with these statements is encouraging. Unfortunately, complications arise if the attitudes of the 
12.5% of males from statement 1 and the 25.0% of males from statement 2 are shared by those 
lawyers who are in management positions. This would mean that management decisions, including 
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those regarding job assignment and partnership status, might be subconsciously biased against 
females. 
Due to the small and age-restricted nature of the NLSY data, further generalizations and 
speculations could result in biased conclusions. It would be very interesting to see how a larger and 
more age-diverse sample of lawyers respond to these statements. Perhaps this is an area for future 
research. 
v. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
While the anal¥sis of wages/salaries and partnership status shows significant support for 
Bergmann's overcrowding hypothesis, more can be done in an attempt to clarifY and strengthen the 
results. Perhaps the most important area for future research would be that of determining the exact 
roles that feedback effects and statistical discrimination (imperfect infonnation) play in the 
origination of crowding. While it is important to realize that some attitudes and variables which may 
be either directly or indirectly related to gender cannot be measured in a tangible manner, the NLSY 
attitude questions provide a starting point from which to develop a more in-depth analysis. Future 
research could focus on the attitude analysis of lawyers and law students, using statements similar to 
those found in the NLSY. By analyzing these attitudes, it might be possible to pinpoint the causes of 
crowding. Once the magnitudes of these effects are isolated, problem areas can be addressed. 
Based on the results of this study, a two step program may be suggested. The first step would 
involve combating low female self-esteem; and the second would involve confronting stereotypes 
concerning the "proper" roles of females in the professional and domestic worlds. As Howlett 
suggests, "Our profession [law] is really a reflection ofwhat is happening in the rest of society 
(ROUNDTABLE 2,28)". Until the stereotypes and misperceptions are eliminated, Bergmann's model 
of labor market overcrowding may continue to be supported by much "intangible" evidence, but little 
measurable evidence. 
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NOTES 
IThe cumulative distribution function for LOGIT, which is used to determine 
probabilities, is as follows: 
For this project, each specific variable's Z value was calculated as the variable's (mean 
value * LOGIT c~effi~ient). Thus, Pi was calculated as 1/[1 + (2.71 * -exp(sum ofal) 
Zs»); e=2.71 (GuJaratl, 1988). 
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SAMPLE SELECTION CRlTERIA: 
1.	 Determined population from American Bar Foundation Table IlL 1: States Ranked by 
Lawyer Population (1988). 
2.	 Calculated percent oflawyer population per state: (# lawyers in the state/totallawyer 
population). 
3.	 Using a sample size of200 female lawyers and 200 male lawyers (over-representation 
of female lawyers), calculated the necessary number of lawyers to be selected from 
each state so that the sample's distribution would be as representative of the population as 
possible: (% lawyers * 200). Rounding criteria: any number greater than 1, with. 645 or 
higher was rol;lnded up, and any number less than 1 was rounded up to 1. 
4.	 Using the 1992 edition of the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, I will select lawyers 
randomly. Random selection process: 
A.	 Calculate the Page Skip Factor (PSF) for each state as follows: (# pages for state x 
I sample # from state x). Rounding criteria: any number with .5 or higher is 
rounded up. 
B.	 Use the random number function on my Casio Scientific Calculator (fx-570A) to 
randomly choose a page on which to start for each specific state. 
C.	 Go to that page. . 
a.	 Female attorneys: Select the first female attorney listed; proceed in selecting 
attorneys by using the PSF. Even if a female is not listed on the specified page, 
use the specified page number to continue selection. (Example: The PSF 
indicated that the next female should be selected from page 57, but a female 
first appears on page 58. Select the female from page 58, but apply the PSF to 
57.) 
b.	 Male attorneys: (Start at the same randomly selected page. Add 5.) Select 
the second male attorney listed; continue selecting additional male attorneys 
by using the PSF--always select the second male attorney. 
SPREADSHEET SET UP 
rank: 1-51; indicates state's rank according to the proportion of U.S. lawyers that 
resides in the state, as reported by the ABF in 1988. 
# lawyers: state-specific population of lawyers in 1988 as reported by the American Bar 
Foundation 
%	 lawyers: % of total U.S. lawyer population as recorded by the ABF in 1988. 
sample:	 % lawyers of a specific state * 200--number oflawyers to be selected from 
the state in order to ensure that the sample is representative of the true 
population ( a population of200 female attorneys will be selected as well as a 
sample of200 male attorneys--overall, there will be an over-representation of 
women) 
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sample A: a whole-number estimate of the sample. Rounding criteria: any number 
greater than 1, with .645 or higher was rounded up, and any number less than 
1 was rounded up to 1. 
pages: # of pages devoted to state x in MDH 
PSF: (page skip factor = pages/sample A) Rounding criteria: any number with .5 
or higher is rounded up 
areas of concentration: the first two listed for each attorney, or the corresponding firm; the 
following areas will be identified: 
CJVll.,: civil, general negligence, product liability, consumer law 
CORP-FIN: . real estate, commercial, business, municipal & administrative, 
anti-trust, insurance, products defense, financial, banking, 
securities & bonds, bankruptcy, creditors' rights 
CRIM: criminal defense, white collar crime 
El\fVIR: environmental, natural resources, gas, mineral, alternative 
energy, energy, land use 
.EST-TAX: estate, probate, trusts, tax 
GP-FAM: general practice, family law, divorce, adoption, juvenile, 
traffic, pension/S.S. benefits, domestic relations, marital law 
INSDEF: insurance defense 
INTL: international, international trade 
LABOR: labor, employment 
L~-APPEL: litigation, civil litigation, tort litigation, commercial litigation 
(when a specific type of litigation is listed, LIT will be 
identified as well as the specific area of practice); appellate, 
appellate advocacy 
MAL: malpractice--medical, lawyer, professional, professional 
negligence 
PATENT: patent, copyright, intellectual property, trademark 
PI: personal injury, workers' compensation, automobile, wrongful 
death 
geographic region:	 The region of practice is assigned based on 1) the state in which the 
individual is registered with respect to MIlli. and 2) U.S. Census 
divisions and regions; the following regions will be used: 
WEST: AK, WA, ill, OR, CA, ID, NV, AZ, UT, MT, WY, CO, NM 
MIDWEST: ND, SD, NE, KS, MO, lA, WI, IL, IN, MI, OH 
SOUTH: TX, OK, AR, LA, MS, AL, TN, KY, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL, 
MD, DE, WASHD.C. 
NORTH: ME, VT, NH, MA, RI, CT, NJ, PA, NY 
NLSY ATTITUDE VARIABLES: 
Attitudes of control: 
CONTROL: Does the individual feel that he/she has control over the direction of 
his/her life is taking? 1=yes; O=no 
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LUCK: Does the individual believe that he/she controls plans once they are 
made? 1=yes; O=no 
FLIPCOIN: "... many time wejust as well decide what to do by flipping a coin." 
1=yes; O=no 
BIGLUCK: Does luck have a big influence over the things that happen to the 
individual? 1=yes; O=no 
Attitudes of Self-Esteem: 
WORTH: "I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with 
others." 1=strongly agree/agree; O=disagree/strongly disagree 
CAPABLE: "I am able to do things as well as most other people." l=strongly 
agree/agree; O=disagree/strongly disagree 
SATISFACTION: "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself." l=stronglyagree/agree; 
O=disagree/strongly disagree 
USELESS: "I certainly fee useless at times." 1=strongly agree/agree; 
O=disagree/strongly disagree 
Family Attitudes: 
FEMHOME: "A woman's place is in the home, not in the office or shop." 
1=strongly agree/agree; O=disagree/strongly disagree 
NOTIME:	 "A wife who carries out her full family responsibilities doesn't have 
time for outside employment." 1=strongly agree/agree; 
O=disagree/strongly disagree 
TRADHAPPY:	 "Women are much happier if they stay at home and take care of the 
children." 1=strongly agree/agree; O=disagree/strongly disagree 
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